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Union Minister for Forests and Environment Jairam Ramesh talks to Diva Arora about the role of BASIC countries in the Copenhagen summit, the challenges of ‘green’ growth and why it’s important for India to engage positively with China
Union minister for Forests & Environment Jairam Ramesh has been occupying this key portfolio since May 2009. Ramesh was adviser to Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao in the early-1990s, when Rao introduced sweeping economic reforms. He then worked in the Planning Commission. Subsequently, Ramesh joined the Congress party and was elected to the Rajya Sabha in June 2004. For several years he has been a secretary of the All India Congress Committee and heads its economic policy unit. Ramesh studied mechanical engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology in Bombay, where he graduated in 1975. He later studied public management at Carnegie Mellon University in the United States, and then technology policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A frequent newspaper columnist and former speechwriter for Congress president Sonia Gandhi, he is the author of Making Sense of Chindia (2005), a collection of essays on the competition – and potential for cooperation – between Asia’s giants. He represented India at the Copenhagen Summit on climate change in December 2009. Has the Kyoto Protocol been delivered a body blow with the emergence of the new block of BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) countries? It is in intensive care. Efforts are being made by the developed countries, including Japan and Australia, to abandon the protocol. The US never ratified it in the first place. The fact of the matter is that the developed countries want a single legally binding treaty. We (developing countries) are resisting it. We do not want the Kyoto Protocol to die. We want to revive it and make it part of the climate agenda. So, in that sense we want it to get a new lease of life. In 2010, there will be negotiations for the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol commitments. But let us be clear: the developed nations do not want it to continue. The European nations, the Japanese and Australians do not want to be part of it. It’s an interesting situation. The Australians complain that the Chinese are not part of the protocol, and nor for that matter are the Americans. China's emissions are to the tune of 23% of world emissions, while those of the US are 22% of world emissions. That means 55% of the world's emissions are emanating from these two countries which are not part of the protocol. You seem to be keen to work closely with China. I've written a book called Chindia which is an abbreviation for China and India. The book was published in 2005. The gist of the book is that India has to learn to engage with China. This is not to say that our differences will be resolved overnight. But I am not a China baiter or a China romantic, nor do I suffer from China phobia. India must learn to engage with the largest economy in the world. If we had also followed a successful economic growth trajectory, we would have been in the same boat [environmental pollution-wise] as China, which has grown much more spectacularly. Our poor delivery system saved us. We are facing problems of growth. The traditional equation has been that prosperity is equal to pollution. Which is why I have been stressing the need to evolve a growth path where we invest in new technologies that are environmentally friendly. We can then grow without the environment costs associated with high growth. That sounds very well but where do we have the resources and the skills to move into this kind of low carbon growth? We have to make the right choices. India cannot depend on the rest of the world. We have to develop our own financial and managerial resources in order to become a world leader in green technology. This requires us to shed our defensive approach. We should see this not as a threat but as an opportunity. After a long time we are not being portrayed in a negative light. Indians, do not forget, were always being criticised for being obstructionists. You cannot forget that the developing countries have been critical of the Copenhagen Accord. Twenty-nine countries, which include Bangladesh, Maldives and Ethiopia, are party to the accord which was made possible because of the BASIC countries. We tried to take the G-77 nations along with us. Their opposition was not to the agreement; rather, they were opposed to the process by which it was arrived at. Let's face it, there was complete mismanagement by the Danish government which was managing the conference. They showed a complete lack of leadership and were not able to control events. The situation reached such a head that the differences between the Danish prime minister and his climate change minister came to the forefront during the climate meet. The developing countries were reacting negatively to the whole process. The BASIC ministers were able to formulate a joint strategy and this solidarity continued right through the meet. There were three issues on which the talks had reached an impasse. First, there was the issue of how should the global goal for 2050 be expressed -- should it be in degree of temperature or in percentage reduction of emissions. Second, what should the regime for monitoring and verification of mitigation be for China and India? And, lastly, should the Copenhagen Accord be a legally binding agreement or should it be a framework for discussion. There was no headway being made in these three areas and the chair was close to announcing a breakdown of talks in which the blame for this (breakdown) would be placed on the shoulders of the BASIC countries. This meant that President Obama would have had to return to the US with little to show for having attended the meet. At 7.15 pm on December 18, he walked into the meeting of the BASIC countries and got down to negotiating all three issues. He pointed out that there were the 43 island states who wanted it expressed as 1.5 degree C and not 2 degrees C. But he came around to accepting the latter proposition. He also came around to accepting that the accord would not be a legally binding document. Let us make it clear that India was not on his radar screen; it was China he was concerned with and the focus was how could (climate change) be monitored in China with the assent of the Chinese government. The Americans gave their suggestions, the BASIC countries gave theirs and the Americans finally agreed to our suggestion. President Obama's intervention was the turning point. It helped finalise the accord and it was the American president who was responsible for selling what BASIC nations had told him to the Europeans. There seems to be more hype than substance in the accord. The Copenhagen conference did not live up to its expectations. But this is not the end of the world. We need to understand that this is not a destination – it’s part of the journey. There are complex scientific, political, economic and social issues involved about which we need to be very careful. Copenhagen was a disappointment. We would have all liked an agreement to which all nations were a party. That is why I said that I was not going to Copenhagen to save humanity; rather, I was going there to protect India's right to development. Protecting India's right to development meant protecting humanity. What was your own approach when you were there? I refused to adopt a moralistic attitude in Copenhagen. We (Indians) are known to be sanctimonious and argumentative. Our environment record is nothing to write about. When I said that Indians deserve a Nobel Prize for dirt, people criticised me. But we have just brought out a report which highlights the pollution levels of 88 of our largest industrial clusters. Our rivers have become extremely polluted. So, our own domestic agenda must be followed very aggressively. If this is followed through and our own records improve, we will be able to negotiate better because it will then be done from a position of strength. What is the biggest obstacle to your ministry implementing environmental schemes on the ground? All our environmental laws are being passed by the centre but they have to be implemented by the state governments. The states do not share our enthusiasm. It is for this reason that we will have to apply moral and political pressure and also offer them financial incentives in order to protect our forests. What kind of financial incentives are you talking about? We are working on that. State governments that are good at implementing environmental projects such as cleaning of rivers and ensuring effluents are not dumped in our rivers must be rewarded. All I can do is initiate action. But your ministry is giving licences left and right for mining projects. Will this not destroy our forests further? In the last seven months I have stopped a number of projects in Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Kerala and Jharkhand. Earlier, 95% of projects that sought clearance would get approved and another 85% received forestry clearance. I have told my officers that they should have a higher rate of rejection. Can you give instances of projects you have actually rejected? I have rejected a power project in Karnataka, a railway project in Jharkhand and mining projects in Maharashtra. The ministry has to learn to say no. We are stipulating conditions and ensuring that none of these projects should violate our forest laws. How are the state governments responding to your no’s? Some state governments are responding. We have to create conditions in which they become partners. Consultations and frequent meetings are the best way to ensure this. Let me tell you this is a thankless job. Industry, trade and politicians criticise me when I say no and environmentalists criticise me every time we clear a project. Whatever I do, I am going to receive brickbats from somebody or the other. Infochange News & Features, January 2010
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