How to evaluate rural development schemes
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COMMENTS 
In 2000-01, almost Rs 10,000 crore was spent on rural development schemes. The central government has almost a dozen major schemes in operation. But how is the success or failure of these schemes to be evaluated? By the quantum of funds allocated? By the fulfilment of targets?Or do we need a social cost-benefit analysis for each scheme?
Rural spending is undertaken at various levels in the government. There is infrastructural spending on roads, railways, electricity, irrigation, agricultural inputs, etc. Then there is the more direct subsidy-oriented spending by central and state government rural development departments. Consider that in 2000-2001, the central Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) spent a total of Rs 9,760 crore on rural development schemes, land resources and drinking water supply in rural areas of the country. This total budget of the MoRD is only 2.76% of the total budgetary outlay for 2000-2001.
Of this Rs 9,760 crore, Rs 6,760 crore went towards rural development schemes in the country in 2000-2001. But how do we evaluate what we have spent so far? How do we evaluate the achievements from that spending?
Rural development schemes may be sponsored by either the centre or state governments, or both. While the central government spent Rs 6,760 crore in 2000-2001, additional state government spending differs from state to state. State governments declare their own schemes, or contribute more resources towards central government schemes.
The central government currently has about 10-12 major schemes operational. They cover areas like rural housing, sanitation, water supply, wage employment, village-level minor infrastructural works, etc.
The fundamental shortcoming of the system is that there is no long-term planning for these schemes. In some cases, modifications take place every year; in others, grants or subsidies may not be reviewed for long periods. The subsidy made under the Indira Awaas Yojana for rural housing has not been reviewed since 1996. This scheme is targeted at the poorest of the poor -- the landless unemployed. The subsidy of Rs 20,000 provided is inadequate to build a house as per the government specifications relating to material, layout, etc. Besides, the beneficiary, in this case, is not in a position to contribute much himself.
On the other hand, provisions for the Self-Help Group Scheme, under the Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana -- the proportion of loan to subsidy provided, allocation towards SC/ST groups, lending guidelines for banks, etc -- change almost every year.
Another scheme, the Employment Guarantee Scheme, was re-launched in 1993 as the Employment Assurance Scheme and modified again in 1999. In spite of the changes, it has been observed that the scheme is often redundant when implemented together with the Jawahar Gram Samriddhi Yojana. This is because both offer wage employment to the unemployed poor by undertaking village-level infrastructural activities, although the nature of the job may vary.
Although these changes/modifications in the schemes are done in the best interests of the beneficiaries and (one assumes) every attempt is made to correct the lacunae, constant changes create confusion in the minds of the administrative set-up at the ground level. Worse is to expect poor, illiterate village folk, at whom these schemes are targeted, to understand their complexities from year to year.
Even assuming that the schemes get better with every modification, and giving the benefit of the doubt to the designers, there are several significant issues that need to be raised in respect of the scheme design and delivery systems.
Let us define success as a scheme in which the benefits are correctly utilised, and failure when the beneficiary fails to make correct use of the benefits of the scheme.
Firstly, what are the objectives? Obviously, they must vary from scheme to scheme, depending on the benefits that are provided under each scheme.
For instance, the rural housing scheme Indira Awaas Yojana provides subsidised housing to the poor. In this case, the effects of the scheme are straightforward and easy to measure. However, what about the Central Rural Sanitation Programme? This scheme is meant to improve access to sanitation and provides subsidies to the rural poor to build latrines. In this case, although providing latrines to the poor is an obvious output, the effects are much greater and wider. The central government prides itself on the number of latrines built under the scheme. The total number of latrines constructed under the programme upto the end of the Eighth Plan period (1996-1997) was 4,337,609, at a total cost of Rs 757.62 crore. But nowhere does it say that over a third of these latrines are not in use. Further, we are not told whether, in a particular area, access to sanitation has increased, the incidence of diarrhoea gone down or infant mortality reduced.
Thus we have a certain number of schemes, and a fixed amount of money allocated towards these schemes. But no social cost-benefit analysis for each of the schemes so that the returns from every rupee spent, or per-unit funds allocated, become available to the planners. So, if providing housing yields lower social returns than providing employment to the jobless, we should assume that greater allocations to employment schemes would yield better results.
As of now, the success of each scheme is determined by the targets achieved, the amount of money spent, and the number of persons it covers. This allocation-based spending ensures that fulfilling targets takes precedence over ensuring quality. No attempts are being made to evaluate or monitor the wider impact of any of these schemes -- either singly or collectively -- on the community, the village or society in general.
The basic problem seems to be the target-oriented approach adopted by the monitoring machinery. This approach needs to be drastically altered, by involving people in the process of development.
While the concept of participatory development has become popular around the developing world, India has made a good start by introducing panchayati raj and making villagers responsible for development activities in their own villages.
For any scheme to succeed, there must be a demand. And so, part of the funding allocated for a scheme must go towards creating awareness and imparting specific education about the scheme and its merits to the intended beneficiaries. This will help ensure that the beneficiaries accept the benefits because they perceive a need for it. This way there is a sense of participation in making the scheme a success. For example, if proper attention is paid towards training and imparting skills to rural youth who are given loans for self-employment, the incidence of loan defaults, as well as the failure of activities started, is likely to be low. The newly-introduced self-help group scheme, based on the Bangladesh Grameen Bank model, has become a huge success, especially in states like Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa. This scheme allocates 10% of the funds earmarked for the formation of each group towards the training of members. Members are encouraged to form their own groups and determine the activity they wish to start up. This ensures their participation, and the scheme is accepted as a response to a perceived need and is therefore perceived more responsibly.
Thus, money spent on training, awareness-generation and education will, more often than not, be money well spent.
Ultimately what is lacking is a definite vision for rural India. This might include, say, total literacy, at least 75% sanitation coverage, two children per family, villages with proper infrastructure, etc. Practical and achievable targets must be set and priorities carefully laid out. Once this is done, schemes can be aimed with precise objectives in mind. This will enable specific parameters to come into play, which will make judging the impact of the schemes much easier.
(Arpita V Bedekar has an MSc in Economic History from the London School of Economics, and is currently employed with a consulting firm in Pune)
InfoChange News & Features, February 2003